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Integrating Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) safely with conventionally 
piloted, manned aircraft presents long-term challenges, especially during the 
lengthy transition period when UAS will be mixed with manned aircraft.  
Integration of dissimilar systems is not an easy, straight-forward task.  In today’s 
active sensor/radar-based airspace system, finding small UAS (sUAS) is 
complicated by their diminutive size and typically low altitudes.  Simply knowing 
they are present in the airspace and knowing their true location can be extremely 
challenging.   
The purpose of this paper is to discuss and encourage industry dialog around 
the significant operational implications and issues with the integration of manned 
and unmanned air vehicles.  As acknowledged in Pappas, Tomlin, Lygeros, 
Godbole, and Sastry, (1997); Ravich (2009); and in Weibel and Hansman (2005), 
moving beyond today’s voice-controlled network will require another method of 
integrating and sharing airspace.  One possible view of future airspace design is 
presented—this view can be a prologue of how airspace could operate 
autonomously, without strain.  Care has been taken in the discussion to balance 
operational flexibility with safety; this is most critical at lower altitudes, in the near 
term, where the vast bulk of sUAS activity is expected to require assured separation 
from manned aircraft. 
A fundamental presumption in this discussion of an unstrained air traffic 
future is a fully networked, autonomous environment in which all air vehicle 
participants are nodes on the network; and, in the long-range view would operate 
without human intervention.  Accomplishing these objectives moves the Air Traffic 
Control (ATC) system of today to an Air Traffic Management (ATM) system 
requiring significantly less direct human control.  A conceptual air traffic 
management philosophy of autonomous self-separation of all nodes on the network 
underpins this future.   
Correspondingly, in a networked airspace with a requirement for active 
participation, if a user is choosing to not participate on the network this action 
would connote either that the user is experiencing an emergency preventing 
network participation, or a purposeful choice to deceive.  The latter scenario could 
be interpreted to be an intruder and a threat to the integrity of the network, a threat 
to the other network participants, or a threat to the populace on the ground. 
Rather than rooted in scientific exploration, the paper is an operational 
postulation based principally on the author’s personal experience as a civil 
(Instructor and Air Transport) pilot, a user of the airspace and air traffic control 
system, and former corporate air traffic management executive program manager.   
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The methodology used in this operational postulation was strongly 
influenced by a blend of Creswell’s (2007) description of case study and grounded 
theory coupled with the University of Southern California’s (USC) (2017) 
description of exploratory design.  The paper concentrates conceptually on what a 
future airspace design must have to safely absorb the anticipated diversity of air 
vehicles, especially the significant infusion and integration of sUAS.  The paper 
does not delve deeply or authoritatively into the details of how a future airspace 
would specifically operate. 
Recognizing the global air transportation system has already entered what 
will likely be a lengthy transition period from manned aviation to unmanned 
aviation, safety must remain as the ultimate benchmark.  In addition to the future 
airspace structure presented in this paper, a brief discussion of the required 
technology issues and obstacles to transition to this future includes topics such as 
self-separation logic, air-vehicle self-healing, cybersecurity, intruder 
detection/mitigation, neural network, societal trust, policy reform, and employment 
implications.  Each subject is described at a macro operations analysis level versus 
a more detailed, systems engineering level.  A similar review of these subjects were 
offered by DeGarmo (2004).  Like DeGarmo’s (2004) overall objective, the 
potential value of such a discussion is to encourage industry dialog about 
possibilities and, more importantly, a focus toward workable, future, air traffic 
solutions. 
Method 
 An exploratory design methodology like that espoused by the USC (2017) 
blended with elements of Creswell’s (2007) description of case study and grounded 
theory qualitative research design significantly influenced the author in capturing a 
vision of a possible future airspace design from a logical extension of the present.  
The paper is exploratory in that it attempts to predict what may occur, offers 
an alternative explanation for how the future airspace could be structured 
differently from today and states direct, causal relationships that must happen to 
enact this future.  These are characteristics that USC (2017) offer as evidence of an 
experimental design but apply strongly to an exploratory design methodology 
where “…there are few or no earlier studies to refer to or rely upon to predict an 
outcome.  The focus is on gaining insights and familiarity for later investigation or 
undertaken when research problems are in a preliminary stage of the investigation.  
Exploratory designs are often used to establish an understanding of how best to 
proceed in studying an issue or what methodology would effectively apply to 
gathering information about the issue.” (USC, 2017).  It is the latter phrase “how to 
best proceed” that drives the motivation for this paper.  The espoused airspace 
design is one possibility.  By exploring and discussing its merits and challenges, it 
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is possible that paths with a higher probability of success may be identified over 
those which would be much less preferable. 
Current International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) airspace design 
was used as a launching point for the exploration.  Modifications to the ICAO 
structure by layer, starting with the airspace closest to the surface of the earth, are 
suggested with specific technological additions to incorporate the influx of sUAS 
and UAS.  Weather criteria, the impacts of technology need on both manned and 
unmanned operations within the airspace, and transition considerations from 
today’s airspace to the proposed airspace are presented and illuminated as issues 
requiring resolution.  These explorations are intended to contribute to the industry 
discussion of future airspace operational principles, requirements, and solutions to 
integration of both sUAS, and UAS with manned aircraft. 
Creswell (2007) states that grounded theory is designed, “…to move 
beyond description and to generate or discover a theory, an abstract analytical 
schema of a process.  Participants in the study would all have experienced the 
process, and the development of the theory might help explain practice or provide 
a framework for further research” (p. 62-63).  While no data was expressly gathered 
to support the espoused future airspace design it is anticipated that the readership 
will also have personal exposure to and hands-on experience with the current ATC 
system, and thus the readership then becomes surrogate participants in the 
discussion.  Furthermore, using the current ICAO airspace structure makes it easier 
to move from something which is familiar to what is proposed. 
Lastly, Creswell (2007) describes case study as that focused on, “…an issue 
explored through one or more cases within a bounded system, i.e., a setting, a 
context.” (p. 73).  The examination offered here is focused on one instance, the 
integration of UAS and manned aircraft, how they must cooperate, and how they 
will continue to operate in a bounded/closed system, the future ATM system. 
Characteristics of the three methodological approaches are blended and 
significantly influenced the author’s experiential views to propose the future 
airspace structure and discuss the issues necessary to support that airspace structure. 
Predications 
Before a more detailed conceptual discussion, there are seven predications 
upon which the proposed airspace design was made: 
1. Every air vehicle is a node on the future air traffic network 
2. An overall operating philosophy of self-separation 
3. The vast bulk of sUAS, at least for the near term, are at low altitudes 
4. The careers of ATC and piloting as we know them today sunset 
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5. sUAS maneuverability exceeds that of piloted aircraft 
6. Trust in autonomous air transport technology is implicit 
7. Current ATC service provisions do not change 
Network Participation 
 
Predication 1. Each air vehicle will be a node on the air traffic network.  
Any air vehicle desiring to access commercial airspace will be required to 
be a continuously active air traffic network participant.  Recreationally manned 
aircraft, commercially manned aircraft, remotely controlled UAS (those controlled 
typically from the ground), semi-autonomous UAS (those that share human input 
with automation), fully autonomous UAS (no human control), and a significant 
infusion of small, lighter weight sUAS (which can either be manually controlled, 
semi-autonomous, or fully autonomous) will be simultaneously competing for 
unimpeded transit in the airspace. 
It is also presumed there will be a significant transition period from a 
historically human-controlled flight in a voice-based network to a long-range future 
where all but the most specialized of flight is autonomously controlled on the air 
traffic network; this transition period has already started.   
Overall Operating Philosophy 
Predication 2. The airspace and the air traffic system of the future will not 
be based on control of individual air vehicles as they are today; rather, both will be 
very similar to current, two-dimensional automobile driving.  They will be based 
on self-separation management of air vehicles and flow in four dimensions (4-D); 
the classic 3-D position and time. 
 Two analogies are offered to help envision the future airspace and air traffic 
system.  The first requires a slight relaxation in the laws of physics, but once that 
is recognized, the analogy should be helpful in conceptualizing the future. 
First, to envision the self-separation of air vehicles, imagine a handful of 
dissimilar-sized, self-repelling magnets thrown into the air1.  Instead of rotating and 
sticking together, imagine the magnets will seek to separate themselves as far apart 
from each other as possible in nature’s most efficient spherical packing method, a 
3-D, hexagonal, closest-packed distribution (Neser, Bechinger, Leiderer & Palberg, 
                                                          
1 This concept is accredited to Mr. Rick Palace, Boeing Air Traffic Management, Herndon, VA, 
(2003) 
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1997).  This vision could also appear like a school of dissimilar-sized fish or a flock 
of dissimilar-sized birds. 
Second, to envision the future air traffic flows, imagine airports are 
connected by a network of arteries and veins similar to organs in the human body.  
The heart is analogous to one major hub airport while the organs represent the 
satellite-destination airports served from that hub. 
Combining these two visions yields the self-repelling magnets as the 
individual air vehicles moving about in organized, ordered traffic flows.  The air 
traffic flows diverge from hub airports towards the satellite airports, similar to the 
divergence of arteries from the human heart, and the air traffic flows would 
simultaneously converge from the satellite airports towards the hub airports, similar 
to the convergence of veins toward the human heart. 
Location of the Vast Bulk of the sUAS 
 
Predication 3. The bulk of the sUAS will be at low altitudes, below 500 ft. 
Above Ground Level (AGL). 
Given their light weight and limited endurance, sUAS will initially be 
concentrated at low altitudes, typically below 500 ft. AGL.  The recently enacted 
Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) Part 107 deals specifically with sUAS, those 
weighing less than 55 pounds, and regulates/restricts their operation to below   400 
ft. AGL.  As improved battery technology directly correlates with and enables 
increased sUAS range/endurance, realistically accessible sUAS flight profiles and 
altitudes will increase. 
According to FlightRadar24 (2016), during daylight hours, approximately 
6,000 aircraft are airborne over the continental United States (U.S.).  Except for 
take-off and landing and selected vocational uses such as agricultural aerial 
application, manned aircraft do not operate below 500 ft. AGL.  The Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) (2015a) predicts marginal to no growth in total 
manned air traffic in the next five to ten years. 
In the unmanned arena, however, the growth projections are much different.  
The FAA (2015a) anticipates that by 2020, “490,500 lower-end UAS” (those 
costing less than $2,500) to be in the fleet in the U.S. alone.  If this prediction is 
accurate, there very well may be a comparatively large number of sUAS competing 
for low-altitude airspace. 
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Effect on Manned Careers 
 
Predication 4. Presumed in this exploration of a future airspace design is 
that the longstanding, aviation careers of both Piloting and Air Traffic Control will 
be “sunset careers,” meaning these careers, as defined today, will eventually 
disappear. 
Piloting will transition in limited application to systems monitoring, and 
ATC will transition from a control function to a management function.  Automation 
resident on each air vehicle will be necessary for safe separation and to supplant 
direct pilot control or the control currently directed by ATC. 
To achieve the current air traffic system safety levels enjoyed in North 
America, Europe, and the Middle East with autonomy will require substantial, long-
term safety-of-life-technology investment, testing, and new certification standards.  
New career fields in software development, validation and verification, air traffic 
system safety monitoring, management, and cyber security must emerge to 
compensate for the loss of direct, human control. 
Air Vehicle Maneuverability 
 
Predication 5. All UAS must react and then adjust their trajectories, 
yielding way to manned aircraft actions.  
Currently, FAR 107.37 requires that sUAS yield right of way to manned 
aircraft.  This regulation, however, does not apply to UAS.  When dissimilar air 
vehicles of size, speed, control, or capability are mixed, care must be exercised to 
ensure safe separation between the air vehicles.  
Due to their small size and light weight, sUAS can maneuver in ways that 
manned vehicles cannot.   Take for example that many commercially available ~1 
lbs. sUAS can do a complete loop, a summersault of 6-inch radius, in 0.1 sec.  The 
radial (turning) acceleration they experience is equivalent to their velocity2 divided 
by their radius of turn.  When the acceleration is divided by acceleration due to 
gravity, this equates to a G-loading of nearly 62 Gs as follows: 
a = (v2/radius)/32 ft./sec2 (1a) 
a = ((circumference of 1 ft. diameter circle/0.1 sec)2/0.5 ft.)/32 ft./sec2 (1b) 
a = ((Π * 1ft/0.1 sec)2/0.5 ft.)/32 ft./sec2 (1c) 
a = 61.9 g (1d) 
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G-loadings that humans can tolerate is predicated on how long the humans 
have exposed and the magnitude of the loading.  A maximum lateral acceleration 
design goal of 20 g for 0.1 sec was offered by Zimmerman and Merritt (1989, p. 
26), and this was with proper seat support and body restraint.  Without supplemental 
systems, such as a G-suit, most humans can withstand 3-5 Gs for modest periods 
of time.  Survivable instantaneous G-loadings can be much higher.  However, as 
soon as a G-loading of 10 Gs is extended to one minute, this is usually considered 
lethal. 
To ensure a survivable, sustained G-loading, manned air vehicles are less 
able to make quick, erratic, or violent trajectory changes compared with sUAS 
which have no human-based restrictions on their maneuverability.  These 
differences become critical when closure rates are high and the distance between 
conflicting air vehicles is small, less than approximately current, nominal 2-5 NMs 
(Nautical Miles) that the FAA uses to separate aircraft.  A potential solution to the 
performance diversity issue would require that all UAS are subordinated to manned 
aircraft; meaning all UAS must react and adjust their trajectories by yielding way 
to manned aircraft actions. 
Trust in Technology 
 
Predication 6. Humans must implicitly trust the technology that will be 
autonomously transporting them. 
The author extensively evaluated confidence in technology, specifically in 
autonomous airliners and found trust must also extend into the larger system in 
which the airliners operate, i.e., the ATC system (Vance & Malik, 2015).  Specific 
factors that heavily influence a human’s ability to trust technology were identified 
as (a) prior behavioral history; (b) breaches of expected behaviors; (c) the service 
provider’s moral integrity, technology investment, and prior history of fiduciary 
obligation satisfaction; (d) automation sophistication; and (e) the reputation of 
those who represent the novel technology.  Weibel and Hansman (2005) found 
nearly identical results in their literature review with a human’s ability to accept 
technology risk. 
As society continues to grow more dependent on multimedia, real-time data 
communications, and the free sharing of data, cybersecurity compromises 
correspondingly grow as potent and legitimate threats.  Trusting in autonomous 
transportation technology will also implicitly trust that the vehicle can stay properly 
connected to a node on the network.  Data integrity compromises can negatively 
affect normal, routine operations as well as sensitive, personal, corporate, or 
national security operations.  Sophisticated, malicious, virus software breaches are 
not required to inflict harm; compromise can occur with simply invalid data. 
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It is inconceivable that control of human life, with any form of automation, 
would be relinquished without exhaustive verification and validation of the 
entrusted system’s integrity and invulnerability to cyber compromise or corruption.  
Earning humans’ trust in an autonomous air transport future will be a monumental 
achievement predicated not only on trust in the air vehicles themselves but also 
confidence in the airspace system in which the air vehicles operate. 
Unchanging Foundations of ATC Service Provision  
 
Predication 7. ATC will always be responsible for the separation of 
participating, piloted vehicles from each other and known obstructions. 
The ability to remain clear of other air vehicle traffic and all obstructions 
are the two foundational tenets of ATC service provision to piloted aircraft; these 
two essential tenets are timeless and will not change, no matter how the service is 
provided.   The ability to affect both tenets with automation for manned and 
unmanned vehicles is yet unproven but necessary if other air vehicles, terrain, 
weather, flight restrictions, and man-made obstacles are to be autonomously 
avoided. With these seven predications intact, the conceptual discussion can more 
effectively proceed. 
Discussion 
This section presents a conceptual overview of the future airspace design, a 
more detailed explanation of each future airspace layer, how the layers differ from 
today’s structure, the technology impacts of the new airspace design, and 
considerations in overall airspace transition to this new design. 
 
Conceptual Overview 
 
Figure 1 shows a schematic of the autonomous airspace of the future with a 
diversity of air vehicles sharing the airspace in a free navigational flow.  In this 
depiction of the future, the air vehicles must be capable of self-separation and 
trajectory de-confliction with each other and obstacles.  For simplicity, the graphic 
suggests a predominately bi-directional flow of opposing traffic with a significantly 
reduced volume of orthogonal, crossing flow.  The future system, however, must 
be able to simultaneously accommodate any air vehicle direction and velocity.    
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Figure 1. The future autonomous airspace must be equitably shared by a diversity of manned and 
unmanned air vehicles differentiated in size and speed but significantly not in capability.  Each must 
communicate their precise location and trajectory intent, have the same ability to sense a conflict 
with other network participants and obstructions, as well as compute and execute de-confliction 
actions.  Bi-directional/opposing and crossing/conflicting traffic flows are shown in this schematic.  
The spheres represent manned aircraft, and the triangles represent UAS.  The size of the sphere or 
triangle connotes the air vehicle’s mass.  Each vehicle communicates their trajectory in equal time 
increments, represented by the dissimilar length arrows projecting ahead of the vehicles.  A 
minimum of two, equal time increments are shown by two, collinear arrows for each vehicle.  The 
direction of the arrows shows intended travel while the magnitude of the arrows shows speed.  Note 
there are differing size manned and unmanned air vehicles with different velocities sharing the 
airspace.  In the center of the figure, immersed in the bi-directional/opposing flow among numerous 
manned and unmanned air vehicles traveling at similar rates of speed, is a small manned aircraft 
traveling at a high rate of speed, shown by the thicker, longer time increment arrows?  A slower, 
manned, formation flight is following behind and slightly to the left.  The UAS in the lower left 
crossing flow is shown de-conflicting its trajectory/yielding the right-of-way to the manned air 
vehicles obstructing its path.  The UAS in the upper center of the figure is shown circumnavigating 
threatening weather.  All network participants must be able to autonomously execute the same, 
predictable de-confliction actions. 
Functionality such as Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-
B), coupled with a TCAS (Terminal Collision Avoidance System) capability, 
would be the foundational building blocks that allow each air vehicle to 
communicate their current, precise, 3-D location, their intended location, plus 
receive the same information from other air vehicles.  The intended location adds 
the necessary and significant enabler of a 4th dimension (4-D), time to the data 
block.  Knowing where each air vehicle will be at defined increments of future time 
Legend:
Manned
One 
increment 
of time
UAS
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is the enabler that allows them, with commensurate decision logic, to self-separate.  
The now 4-D data block must include 3-D position plus trajectory into the future 
(time) with sufficient accuracy to allow self-de-confliction with other air vehicles, 
and self-de-confliction with all digitally data-based obstructions.  Mapped terrain, 
man-made structures, transmitted weather, and air traffic system flight restrictions 
are examples of digitally data-based obstructions. 
With standardized, trajectory-optimization, decision logic, all air vehicles 
as network participants could also organize into flows.  To enable the maximum 
utility of airspace, the required ADS-B Out/In and TCAS functionality must be 
miniaturized in size, especially weight so that it is compatible with the smallest air 
vehicles comprising the flows.  Flows must be predicated on established criteria 
which regulate the speed at selected distances from the point of intended landing, 
or for vertical take-off and land (VTOL)-capable air vehicles, the point of intended 
alignment.  Self-separation and speed-control will facilitate matching demand and 
capacity at points in space, or the destination airports where flows are converging. 
Significantly complicating the future airspace will be the diversity and mix 
of manned and unmanned air vehicles of grossly different sizes, thus inertia.  The 
combination of air vehicles should co-mingle without impacting each other’s 
trajectories or terrain, weather, flight restrictions, and man-made obstacles.  To 
ensure that no two air vehicles touch is a challenging physics, a 3-D optimization 
problem that must in real-time accommodate the flow and capacity demands made 
of each route and each airport.  What is being optimized is the number and types of 
air vehicles that can be safely and reliably mixed in the airspace.  
The key, system success metric will be time; the minimization of time 
required to transit between two points.  Any deviation from this minimum will be 
considered as decreasing efficiency.  This time deviation metric is easily additive 
and can be observed for a single air vehicle of interest, a fleet of air vehicles 
(defined as those which share an organized commonality), segments of the future 
system such as individual flows or geographic areas of interest, or the system in its 
entirety.  Large-scale, flow management functions currently performed in the U.S. 
Air Traffic Control System Command Center will have to be absorbed by each air 
vehicle.  Every air vehicle participant in the future will need the ability to re-route 
around obstructions in their originally desired trajectory, adhere to adjustments in 
the flow in which they are immersed, and then, if necessary, re-integrate themselves 
into a revised flow. 
The networked future will need to accommodate participants who desire to 
complete their transit manually, semi-autonomously, and fully autonomously from 
the first movement of the air vehicle from its starting point at its origin to the last 
movement at its destination.  Sequencing of participants may be simpler if the 
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current, FAA “first come/first served” model (FAA, 2015b, paragraph 2-1-4) were 
retained; however, an alternative, proposed model that should make flow 
integration more efficient is “on-time/first-served”, meaning those participants that 
accurately estimate when they will be ready to enter the system, or meet waypoints 
in the system, will be queued ahead of those with less precise time estimates 
(Boeing, 2004).  Current, FAA time-based, flow-management, while very similar 
conceptually to on-time/first-served, does not assign air traffic priority based on 
ability to meet scheduled times of arrival (FAA, 2009). 
In a system predicated on self-separation, the safety distance required 
between participants will require accurate, 4-D positions.  Where the need for 
maneuver exists to avoid conflict, an accurate, 4-D position allows each participant 
the ability to adjust their flight path by either absorbing or dissipating momentum.  
Small, light, agile, sUAS can withstand maneuver limits that are incompatible with 
human flight thus can be safely separated at much closer distances than large, 
heavy, air vehicles that have slower response times to flight control commands.   
Each participating air vehicle will need to possess the same, self-separation 
decision-logic.  As popular destinations are approached and converged upon, 
graduated flow restrictions will be placed upon all vehicles desiring access to the 
same location.  The closer to the destination, the more stringent the restrictions will 
be in meeting time estimates.  Participants will enter homogeneous flows of similar 
air vehicle size and momentum to minimize their speed difference/separation 
distances and, more importantly, the wake turbulence effects of the preceding air 
vehicles on the air vehicle(s) immediately following. 
If at any time a choke point in the system develops in the air or with ground 
infrastructure (runways, taxiways, gates, receiving areas), participants must choose 
either a non-interfering wait posture similar to today’s holding pattern or re-route 
to alternate destinations.  These choices are not materially different than what is 
done manually in today’s ATC system protocol to accommodate contingency flow 
operations. 
As with unmanned operations in the future, manned or piloted operations 
will also transfer the current, ATC traffic separation responsibility to the air vehicle.  
Both the future pilots and the remaining air traffic controllers will be respective 
system monitors for safety-of-flight integrity.  Pilots will have complete awareness 
of all the air vehicles around them and notification of trajectories requiring conflict 
resolution. 
The described conceptual future airspace design has these characteristics: it 
is chaotic in appearance, but at the same time orderly, accommodating, responsive, 
efficient, safe, cyber-secure, and autonomous.  The following airspace structure, 
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technology impact, and system transition discussions illustrate, starting with 
airspace layers, how these characteristics interleave. 
Proposed Future Airspace Structure 
 
Tenets.  The future airspace design presented in Figure 2 is a simplification 
of the basic, ICAO-based design presently employed in the U.S. with the addition 
of one new and unused layer, Class F.   
 
 
Figure 2. The ICAO-based, future airspace design closely resembles that of today with the 
significant differences being simplicity and uniformity at each airspace classification, and the use 
of Class F airspace.  The proposal for Class G airspace starting at the surface and universally 
extending to 500ft AGL is to only permit non-networked sUAS operations.  Class F, currently not 
incorporated or utilized in the U.S., is proposed primarily for non-networked, visual flight rules 
(VFR) operations of recreational, single-piston engine, manned aircraft between 500ft and   2,500ft 
AGL.  Class E is proposed as primarily commercial airspace for lower altitude operations of both 
manned and unmanned air vehicles from 2,500ft AGL to Flight Level (FL) 180.  FL180 is 18,000ft 
above Mean Sea Level (MSL).  Class A remains unchanged for manned, commercial IFR operations 
but can include appropriately equipped UAS.  Class D, C, and B remain to handle manned aircraft 
at successively larger airports and excludes all UAS VFR operations but will include UAS 
instrument flight rules (IFR) operations.  For simplicity in the national airspace system, each Class 
D, C and B airspace retain the identical horizontal and vertical dimensions independent of their 
geographic location. 
These tenants, or guiding assumptions, were used in the reconstruction of 
which activities are permissible in the various airspace layers and volumes: 
• All airspace would be available for commercial purposes including Class 
G—the airspace closest to the earth’s surface. 
A – IFR, Networked; Piloted VFR not allowed
FL600
FL180
2,500 AGL
500 AGL
Surface D
10 NM
10,000 AGL
30 NM
B5,000 AGL
20 NM
C
G – < 55 lbs TOGW, Not Networked; 
Piloted VFR not allowed
F – > 55 lbs TOGW, Not Networked; 
Piloted VFR in VMC
E – VFR/IFR Networked; Piloted VFR in VMC
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• Except for manned aircraft taking off, landing or aerial applicators (FAR 
137), Glass G airspace would be segregated to sUAS operations only.  All 
other airspace would be open to properly IFR-equipped UAS thus 
integrating them with manned aircraft.  This philosophy is a significant 
departure from the current segregation approach to any UAS operations in 
controlled airspace or within 5 NM of towered airports. 
• All unmanned operations outside of Class G must be IFR. 
• Class F airspace will allow manned, recreational, single-piston engine, non-
networked Visual Flight Rules (VFR) operations in Visual Meteorological 
Conditions (VMC). 
• Manned aircraft operating under VFR in Class E must operate in VMC and 
will be required to be active participants in the air traffic network. 
• All operations in Class A, B, C, D and E airspace, and all operations in Class 
F and G airspace when operating under IFR, will be conducted as an 
observable participant on the air traffic network. 
• To ease user understanding and respect for Class D, C, and B airspace 
dimensions, all are cumulative; meaning Class C is identical in shape to 
Class D but with the second layer on top, and Class B is identical in shape 
to Class C but with a third layer on top. 
• Each respective Class D, C and B airspace would be universally consistent 
in volume and independent of airport geographic location. 
• For consistency and simplicity with navigation convention in NM, all 
weather-related visibilities are quoted in NM; no longer will weather-
related visibilities be quoted in Statue Miles (SM). 
• VFR weather minima would be defined identically with VMC (greater than 
2,500ft AGL ceilings, and greater than 5 NM visibility). 
• Marginal Visual Meteorological Conditions (MVMC) will be defined as 
ceilings greater than 500ft AGL, but less than 2,500ft AGL, and visibility 
greater than 3 NM, but less than 5 NM.  MVMC will require flight under 
IFR in all airspace, except below 2,500ft AGL in Class D, C, and B where 
manned flight in MVMC under VFR would be permitted. 
• IFR weather minima would be defined identically with Instrument 
Meteorological Conditions (IMC); which will be defined as less than   500ft 
AGL ceilings, and less than 3 NM visibility).  These last three definitions 
for VMC, MVMC, and IMC would couple the regulatory requirements for 
VFR/IFR flight with the VMC/IMC weather minima, respectively. 
For Class A, B, C, D and E airspace, network participation, and 
correspondingly observing the lack of network participation, are fundamental to 
this future.  To accommodate the diversity of air vehicles co-occupying airspace, 
the accurate and instantaneous communication of 4-D trajectories requires network 
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participation.  Participation in the network is also the enabling ability for air 
vehicles to self-separate.  For any air vehicle operating in Class A, B, C, D and E 
airspace that possesses one or more of the following characteristics (a) greater that 
55 lb TOGW, (b) more than one piston engine, or (c) turbine-engine(s) a lack of 
network participation will constitute a threat. 
Airspace structural differences from today.  The significant differences 
from today’s manned, piloted airspace design are highlighted below with a 
proposed, “plain English” title for each type of airspace following the ICAO 
designation. 
Class G–uncontrolled. [Below 500ft AGL] This airspace is reserved 
exclusively for sUAS operations, either recreational or commercial, and is not 
controlled by ATC.  All air vehicles must weigh less than 55 lbs. Take-Off Gross 
Weight (TOGW).  Other than the ability to self-separate, no restrictions or specific 
requirements would be placed on private or commercial operations, air vehicle 
certification/licenses, or avionics/communications.  Class G airspace would be the 
only airspace in which less than 55 lbs. uncertified/unlicensed sUAS operations 
would be permitted.  Other than for take-off, landing or aerial applicators, no 
operations would be allowed in Class G for any air vehicles greater than 55 lb. 
The 55-lb TOGW threshold has been adopted by the FAA from the 
Academy of Model Aeronautics (AMA) who use it to distinguish a “large model 
airplane” where additional training and specifications apply to hobbyists at an 
AMA airfield (AMA, 2015).  In consideration of unrestricted, low-altitude, sUAS 
operations, there is an intuitive safety concern that the 55 lbs. limit seems high.  An 
objective, third-party, operations analysis study which balances utility with safety 
could be helpful in suggesting a lower alternative, possibly in the 15-20 lbs. range, 
similar to current, British UAS regulation.  However, it should be appreciated that 
if golf balls are lethal to humans (Pfankuch, 2010), then sUAS much less than 15 
lbs. can also be lethal—this weight limit deserves dedicated to research, public 
vetting, and careful regulatory promulgation. 
Class F–low-altitude recreational/commercial.2 [Above 500ft AGL, but 
below 2,500 ft. AGL] This airspace is designed primarily for the piloted, single-
piston engine, a recreational user who owns either a vintage aircraft without an 
electrical system or a simple, low-cost aircraft for pleasure VFR flying.  This 
airspace can also accommodate low-altitude commercial IFR operations.  All air 
vehicles must weigh greater than 55 lbs. TOGW.  Piloted VFR requires VMC.  
There are no restrictions nor requirements for aircraft avionics/communications for 
private, non-commercial, piloted VFR operations; although, it is encouraged that 
                                                          
2 Currently, there is no Class F in the United States. 
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minimal equipage to self-separate and join the network be installed.  Piloted IFR 
will be required in either MVMC or IMC.  All commercial air vehicles and 
commercial operations must be certified/licensed, equipped with self-separation 
capability, ability to communicate with the air traffic network and operate under 
IFR.  Recreational, piloted IFR operations must be identically equipped as 
commercial air vehicles. 
Unless ATC radar is painting the non-participating aircraft – and – it has 
been determined to be a non-threat – and – this info can be broadcast on the future 
network so that all participating aircraft can avoid the non-networked recreational 
user, the UAS in this airspace will require a sense-and-avoid system to operate in 
Class F.  Recreational, non-networked users should only be operating VMC in 
Class F, so manned aircraft would still bear a see-and-avoid separation 
responsibility. 
Class E–low-altitude controlled. [Above 2,500ft AGL, but below 18,000ft 
MSL] This airspace is designed for low-altitude, commercial IFR operations but 
can also accommodate low-altitude recreational VFR and IFR operations.  All air 
vehicles must weigh greater than 55 lbs. TOGW, be certified/ licensed, equipped 
with self-separation capability, and ability to communicate with the air traffic 
network.  Piloted VFR requires VMC; whereas, piloted IFR will be required in 
either MVMC or IMC. 
Class D–controlled; towered. [Within 5 NM of the Control-Towered airport 
below 2,500ft AGL] This positive ATC-controlled airspace primarily serves local 
operations and typically will not include scheduled air service.  All air vehicles 
must weigh greater than 55 lbs. TOGW, be certified/ licensed, equipped with self-
separation capability, and ability to communicate with the air traffic network.  
Piloted VFR will be permissible in VMC and MVMC; whereas piloted IFR will be 
required in IMC.  All manned and unmanned air vehicles require communication 
with and permission from towered ATC. 
Class C–controlled; towered; restrictions. [Within 5 NM of the Control-
Towered airport below 2,500ft AGL, and within 10 NM above 2,500ft AGL, but 
below 5,000ft AGL] This positive ATC-controlled airspace primarily serves 
regional operations and typically will include scheduled regional air service.  All 
air vehicles must weigh greater than 55 lbs. TOGW, be certified/ licensed, equipped 
with self-separation capability, and ability to communicate with the air traffic 
network.  Piloted VFR will be permissible in VMC and MVMC below 2,500ft 
AGL; whereas, piloted IFR will be required in IMC.  Above 2,500ft AGL, piloted 
VFR requires VMC and piloted IFR will be required in either MVMC or IMC.  All 
manned and unmanned air vehicles require communication with and permission 
from towered ATC. 
15
Vance: Opening Autonomous Airspace
Published by Scholarly Commons, 2017
  
Class B–large; controlled; towered; restricted. [Within 5 NM of the 
Control-Towered airport below 2,500ft AGL, within 10 NM above 2,500ft AGL, 
but below 5,000ft AGL, and within 15 NM above 5,000ft AGL, but below 10,000ft 
AGL]–This positive, ATC-controlled airspace primarily serves national operations 
and will include regional, national and international scheduled air service.  All air 
vehicles must weigh 55 lbs. TOGW, be certified/ licensed, equipped with self-
separation capability, and ability to communicate with the air traffic network.  
Piloted VFR will be permissible in VMC and MVMC below 2,500ft AGL; whereas, 
piloted IFR will be required in IMC.  Above 2,500ft AGL, piloted VFR requires 
VMC and piloted IFR will be required in either MVMC or IMC.  All manned and 
unmanned air vehicles require communication with and permission from towered 
ATC. 
Class A–high-altitude controlled. [Above 18,000ft MSL (FL180)] This 
airspace is designed for high-altitude, commercial IFR operations.  All air vehicles 
must weigh greater than 55 lbs. TOGW, be certified/ licensed, equipped with self-
separation capability, and ability to communicate with the air traffic network.  
Piloted IFR in any weather conditions will be required.  Piloted VFR not permitted. 
Required Technologies 
 
There are at least five significant components of this proposed future 
airspace design that are still immature technology (a) autonomous, self-separation 
logic, (b) the ability of autonomous air vehicles to survive catastrophic system 
and/or mechanical failures and self-heal with graceful degradation, (c) complete 
cyber security of the network, (d) detection and mitigation of intruders, and (e) full 
deployment of healing, neural networks.  The first two immature technologies, self-
separation, and self-healing, must be resident on each air vehicle while the 
remaining three immature technologies would need to be shared between the air 
vehicles and the overall network. 
 Self-separation logic.  Self-separation can be accomplished either actively 
or passively.  Active self-separation has historically required an expensive, heavy, 
indigenous-to-the-vehicle ability to sense-and-avoid conflicts.  Typically, this 
active sensor has been a sophisticated, air-to-air radar and limited to military 
aircraft.  Ultra-lightweight avionics will be required to truly open the Class G 
airspace to unrestricted sUAS operations.  The avionics size, power, and space 
requirements for active sense-and-avoid, while a logical vehicle requirement, will 
still be a significant stretch for 55 lbs. class sUAS and possibly incompatible with 
significantly lighter sUAS.  Substantial progress in miniaturization of active sense-
and-avoid systems has been made as evidenced by MIT Lincoln Labs (Duffy, 2014) 
but the overall capabilities remain embryonic (Carey, 2016; Exelis, 2013).  It may 
be a significant overstatement to assume that shortly, ultra-lightweight air vehicles 
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will have active sense-and-avoid capability (Erwin, 2015).  With avionics 
miniaturization, passive sense-and-avoid, such as ADS-B Out/In functionality, is 
feasible and is required to effect self-separation capability. 
The very nature of the hobby, or recreational, less than 55 lbs. sUAS, is ad 
hoc operations, those operations that are not necessarily planned.  For the future 
airspace to accommodate all manner of ad hoc operations, management of the 
airspace will likely not be centralized.  Given the current, restrained proliferation 
of sUAS, the sheer volume of unrestrained sUAS operations in the future airspace 
strongly suggests the need for self-separation, not positive control from a 
centralized, ground facility. 
In the immediate future, self-separation would most likely occur passively 
and must occur automatically between manually controlled UAVs, those on 
autonomous flight profiles, and manned aircraft.  Minimum, passive self-
separation, common-equipage requirements for any vehicle in the airspace of the 
future could facilitate this capability.  This basic safety obligation to keep air 
vehicles separated points away from centralized, positive-controlled air traffic to a 
self-separated, distributed air traffic network model.  The key point, however, is the 
air vehicle then must assume self-separation responsibility and possess the 
technology to affect this responsibility. 
The ADS-B Out/In and TCAS functionality introduced previously to safely 
self-separate two air vehicles are known as a pair-wise, one-on-one calculation.  In 
order to separate from more than one air vehicle at a time, the trajectories of the 
other conflicting vehicles would have to be considered.  Trajectory optimization 
then becomes a computed extension of the pair-wise ADS-B Out/In and TCAS 
functionality which includes other nearby vehicles; this is known as a one-on-many 
calculation.  A layered approach based on time-to-conflict seems logical so that the 
highest priority conflicts, those that will occur first, are mitigated, then followed by 
later predicted conflicts.  When all air vehicles are equipped with the same decision 
logic, it should be very reasonable to predict safe, de-conflicted trajectories for 
more than two, converging air vehicles (Gardi Sabatini, Ramasamy & Kistan, 
2014). 
In an extreme scenario where many air vehicles are converging on the same 
point (known as a many-on-many calculation), nature provides a potential 
solution—a swarm (Findler, Narayanan, & Hill, 2006).  All air vehicles would be 
required to either become a member of the swarm or execute a diverging route away 
from the swarm.  A swarm requires both simultaneous speed and trajectory 
compliance from all participants until a different flight path is selected and the 
participant leaves the swarm.  A significant, self-separation hurdle will be 
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perfecting the autonomous many-on-many optimization logic and then deploying 
this logic in lightweight avionics. 
Air vehicle self-healing. The air vehicles themselves, especially those 
carrying passengers, must possess the ability to heal in a controlled and survivable 
manner from degradation.  Vehicle maladies that must be survivable include minor-
to-catastrophic loss from system malfunction, physical loss of an airframe 
component(s), or an environmentally induced calamity such as ice, electrical 
energy, volcanic ash, or violent, atmospheric air movements. 
As an extreme example, systems failures and airframe component loss as 
improbable as United Airlines Flight 232 experienced in July 1989 will have to be 
survivable simply because the air vehicle itself possesses the ability to absorb the 
damage and recover for a safe landing.  In this accident, the DC-10 aircraft 
catastrophically shed its #2 engine fan disk which severed and completely 
compromised the three hydraulic systems.  All flight controls, high-lift devices, 
trim surfaces, brakes, and nose-wheel steering were instantly rendered inoperative.  
The only controls the pilots had were the remaining two engine throttles.  This was 
a billion-to-one probability of occurrence event and deemed unsurvivable.  
However, due to the heroic efforts of the flight crew, 175 of the 285 occupants 
survived (Haynes, 1991; NTSB 1990). 
Numerous researchers and authors have offered the year 1995 as the 
approximate tipping point where humans became the largest contributory cause to 
transport-category aviation accidents (Hilkevitch, 2012; Lowy 2011; Patterson, 
2012; Veillette and Decker, 1995; Wood, 2004).  Flight Safety Foundation 
President, Bill Voss, during the April 2012, San Antonia Corporate Aviation Safety 
Seminar was quoted by Wright (2013), “Five years ago we passed the point where 
automation was there to back up pilots. Clearly, today, the pilot is there to back up 
the automation.” 
In contrast to how the pilots accomplished saving United Airlines Flight 
232 nearly 30 years ago, it is fully appreciated that current air vehicles’ ability to 
heal in-flight are still at grossly insufficient levels of maturity and reliability to 
facilitate the envisioned networked future airspace design.  Vehicle self-healing 
maturity and reliability are recognized and respected as steep technological 
requirements and are actively being researched at Georgia Tech, the University of 
Michigan, and Stanford (Atkins, 2010; see also Asadi, Sabzehparvar, Atkins & 
Talebi, 2014; Balchandran & Atkins, 2016; Choi & Atkins, 2009; Donato & Atkins, 
2016). 
Cybersecurity. The network components that must be cyber-secured 
include all navigation, communication, and safety-of-flight electronic functionality 
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required to facilitate operations in the future airspace design.  Neither the network 
nor the air vehicles can be susceptible to foreign, uninvited intrusion or 
compromise.  The primary cybersecurity concern is the free flow and data integrity 
of the air vehicle-to-air vehicle automatic communications that must occur to 
ensure safe self-separation. To facilitate the unimpeded flow of information, all air 
vehicles would have to have the same omnidirectional/spherical transmission 
capability.  Unimpeded, spherical transmission from air vehicles cannot be 
accomplished from a single transmission point on the air vehicle, an  antenna is 
required; this challenge is exacerbated by increasing the physical size of the air 
vehicle. 
Any compromise in an air vehicle’s ability to transmit, and receive, valid 
trajectory data from surrounding air vehicles will require the degraded vehicle 
increase its self-separation distances.  A vehicle with a total power loss would be 
one example of an extreme, worst-case situation since no other vehicle could sense 
its presence passively.  Another extreme, very challenging scenario would be 
identifying vehicles that are transmitting corrupted data.  In either scenario, the 
affected vehicles would need to remove themselves from the airspace immediately 
and land at the nearest suitable point.  Either scenario could be a vehicle anomaly, 
or induced by external malicious intent such as jamming. 
The technology to simultaneously and continuously guard or shield against 
cyber threats across a diverse terrestrial, airborne and spaceborne network is a 
monumental undertaking.  While components of this cyber-secure network exist 
today, the current reliability of that protection would likely be judged as insufficient 
for the widespread, autonomous air traffic network application envisioned.   
Intruder detection/mitigation. Intruders are, at the minimum, disruptions 
to the normal flow of air traffic.  Determination of an intruder is a binary problem, 
either the air vehicle is an intruder or not.  Determination of whether or not the 
intruder is also a threat is much more complicated, but in the end is also a binary 
decision.  In order to handle disruptions, both the logic deployed on every 
participating air vehicle and the logic resident in whichever distributed ATC 
facilities remain will have to be able to (a) efficiently remove the threat of non-
participants (b) remove participants whose integrity of network connectivity falls 
below levels that permit predictable and safe, self-separation behaviors, and (c) 
assist in the response to flow disruptions.  These are complicated scenarios that 
must be reduced to acceptable, binary outcomes. 
 In addition to either air vehicle-induced or weather-induced flow 
disruptions, an air vehicle which is a non-network participant also challenges the 
safe and efficient operation of the air traffic system.  Given all air vehicles in this 
future airspace design operating in Class A, B, C, D, E, and F and G airspace, when 
19
Vance: Opening Autonomous Airspace
Published by Scholarly Commons, 2017
  
operating IFR, are required to be active net participants, intruders must be 
detectable by their absence of participation on the net.  Active, most likely ground-
based sensors need to be strategically positioned to be a final protection against 
threats in high-density traffic areas or around national assets.  In these locations, an 
intruder’s location can be determined and communicated to the air traffic network 
instantaneously.  When active sensors have the reliable ability to detect bird-sized 
sUAS, network participation could be corroborated with the sensor-provided 
location.  Correspondingly, a detected air vehicle which lacks network participation 
data will connote non-participation and be classified as an intruder. 
For any net participant without active sensors to avoid non-network air 
vehicles, an off-board sensor to detect the non-network air vehicles and provide 
that information back to the air traffic network will be required.   In the past and 
present, the air traffic industry has relied on ground-based radar to perform this 
function; however, it must be appreciated that ground-based active sensors are 
expensive and infrastructure-intense.  When outside of active sensor ranges, it will 
be a significant challenge, if even possible, to locate intruders and more 
significantly, to confirm the intent of intruders—these are issues without easy 
answers but nonetheless necessary to be solved for network integrity. 
Non-air-traffic-network participants in any airspace outside of active sensor 
range (hence undetected) are, at the minimum, problematic—and without 
resolution could be disastrous to the viability of this future, air traffic network 
concept.  Exotic technologies such as gravity gradiometers, multi-static radar, and 
satellite-based atmospheric wake/emissions/thermal detection may be necessary to 
overcome this obstacle.  For consideration, one brute-force, calloused technology 
and policy approach could be, once the ability to eliminate intruders upon detection 
is possessed, advertise that ability and reason that any intruder bold enough to 
challenge that ability must be of ill-intent and justifiably eliminated.  This approach 
has significant societal and global ethical implications that would have to have 
universal agreement to enact. 
Neural network. An additional and necessary component of each air 
vehicle being a participant in the air traffic network is sufficient communications 
bandwidth.  Beyond what is required for the communication of precise position and 
trajectory, all air vehicles’ bandwidth must also support the simultaneous 
requirement to be a consumer and pass-through for three data streams (a) weather 
reports, observations, advisories, and predictions; b) current, emergent and 
expected regulatory flight restrictions such as Flight Data Center (FDC) Notices to 
Airmen (NOTAMS) or Temporary Flight Restrictions (TFRs); and c) safety-of-
flight advisories such as security/navigation or emergency actions.  Each 
participant must use, to their individual-air-vehicle-advantage, the information they 
are also passing through to the network.  When summed, the participants are acting 
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like nerves in a network; they have a position, they sense, and then pass 
information—these are the fundamental elements of a neural network. 
Neural networks function like our brain’s network.  “Neural networks have 
the ability to adapt to changing input, so the network produces the best possible 
result without the need to redesign the output criteria.” (Investopedia, 2017).  This 
is an important characteristic that allows neural networks to grow, shrink or heal 
while not compromising their purpose; in the future airspace application, the output 
criteria is the free flow of the air vehicle’s precise position, trajectory and the three 
data streams noted above. 
The significant advantage of a neural network approach to data flows is, the 
more participants in each volume (i.e., the closer they are spaced), the more actively 
and easily information will flow about the network.  Adding participants 
strengthens the network, and deleting a participant will not negatively impact the 
network integrity unless there are no other communications routes within the 
compatible range of the transmitting air vehicle.  In the absence of a participant, 
and if the remaining participant spacing supports these now longer transmission 
ranges, the network can heal.  Where participant spacing is too large to facilitate 
atmospheric transmission, a backup mode must exist for the transmission of these 
message streams.  Each message stream could be pushed to an overhead satellite 
network and redistributed.  This back-up, the overhead-communications mode 
would be necessary for lightly trafficked areas. 
The information passed on this network should complement and could 
influence the computed, air vehicle trajectory for any participant.  Any of the data 
passed over the network may be treated as an obstruction when appropriate to do 
so; for example, air traffic flows will be automatically able to ebb and adjust to 
severe weather/flight restrictions passed over the network.  If functioning as 
discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the future air traffic network will be a large, 
living, neural network. 
Assuming cybersecurity, self-healing technology for both the air vehicles 
and the air traffic neural network, self-separation, and intruder detection are 
technologically mature, this future airspace design’s impacts to safety and security 
are significant.  The human-induced variability in either the piloting of the air 
vehicles or in the control of the air vehicles currently exercised by ATC would 
default to the vehicles’ inherent ability to self-separate and organize into 
homogeneous flows, no matter whether the air vehicles and the network were in a 
fully-operational or degraded, self-healing state.  Theoretically, if these conditions 
can be met, the error caused by human variability could be significantly reduced 
and possibly eliminated. 
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System Transition 
 
The significant challenge facing transition is the co-mingling of manned and 
unmanned air traffic.  A system comprised of one or the other type of air traffic 
would be much simpler to operate.  In the long run, this paper is postulating aviation 
will very likely transition to a completely automated structure.  It is the intervening 
transition decades which present the significant challenge (Vance & Malik, 2015).  
Investing in, deploying, and perfecting passive, self-separation technology 
facilitates an initial integration between unmanned and manned air vehicles with 
the previously suggested caveat that manned aircraft retain maneuver priority over 
UAVs.  Segregation is another approach to integration where blocks of airspace are 
sectioned/cordoned for only one type of air vehicle; however, wide-scale 
segregation does not tackle the much more difficult, long-range view of mixed-use 
airspace where manned and unmanned air vehicles safely complete their sorties in 
the same airspace, independent of their flight control mechanism. 
An autonomous air traffic future aids transition in providing an internet 
protocol like foundation on which capacity can be managed with minimal 
infrastructure impact.  Since the network is comprised of a self-governing 
collection of nodes (air vehicles), nodes can be added to and subtracted from the 
network at will. 
The transition should conservatively occur in layers from the surface up.  
Class G containing only less than 55 lbs. sUAS could be the first beta test to 
examine and verify that the airspace within 5 NM around airports with control 
towers (either Class B, C, or D) remains free of sUAS from the surface to 500 ft. 
AGL.  Class F would follow to ensure that unless they are operating IFR, all UAS 
remain clear of Class B, C, or D airspace from 500 ft. AGL to 2,500 ft. AGL.  For 
the remainder of class F airspace, all UAS will be required to operate IFR and must 
be able to avoid all other traffic including private (non-commercial), non-network 
participants.  Finally, advancing then to Class E and A airspace, traffic separation 
protocols should be easier if the previous integration challenges have been 
successfully negotiated at the lower airspace levels. 
It is anticipated that in the transition period initially there will be an 
inversely proportional relationship between altitude and the concentration of UAS.  
Given the future airspace design espoused in this paper restricts sUAS to Class G 
and less than 500ft AGL, the inversely proportional relationship implies that the 
threat of manned-UAV conflicts reduces as altitude is gained.  This inversely 
proportional relationship also presumes that the bulk of greater than   55-lb UAS 
operations will be at lower altitudes in Class F and E airspace.  As the functions 
performed by manned aircraft yield to unmanned, the density of unmanned air 
traffic will increase, and the spread of UAS across Class F, E and A airspace will 
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likely become more uniform.  For those few remaining manned aircraft operating 
in Class F, E or A airspace, the conflict threat would correspondingly grow more 
uniform and not be altitude dependent. 
Societal obstacles to transition. Three principle categories of societal 
challenges lie ahead and will, if unresolved, inhibit or prevent transition (a) human 
trust in autonomy, (b) policy reform to accommodate sUAS and UAS, and (c) 
employment. 
Trust.  Human trust in autonomy that involves safety-of-life transportation 
systems will likely be tested on the ground first with autonomous automobiles, and 
with trains (Folsom, 2011; Kelly, 2012).  The lessons learned in these transportation 
modes about capacity versus demand management, accommodation, usage, and 
economics should provide a reasonable foundation for translation to air travel for 
either personal air taxis or more traditional, transport-category aircraft.  It would be 
more logical if air cargo completed this transition first, followed by the autonomous 
air transport of humans (Patterson, 2012; Vance & Malik, 2015). 
Policy reform.  Regulation, certification, privacy, and liability are all policy 
areas that will need reform.  Aviation regulation and certification to standards are 
time-tested processes with careful, meticulous, functioning change mechanisms.  
Aviation regulation and certification to standards are well understood and likely 
easier obstacles to overcome than either privacy or liability.  If Class G airspace 
operates as suggested, the public will have to absolve their government from 
liability protection against sUAS damage to their property.  This responsibility will 
transfer completely to the sUAS owner/operator.  Responsibility for damage caused 
by all other manned or UAVs greater than 55 lbs. would be shared by the federal 
government and the owner/operators based on the proportion of the vehicle’s flight 
which was conducted autonomously.  The government should only be liable for the 
portion which was human controlled by government ATC employees. 
Privacy laws would need explicit clarification on what type overflight of 
any air vehicle would constitute a breach.  The current definitions of navigable 
airspace extending from the surface of the earth may no longer be sufficient when 
sUAS can precisely maneuver at minimal altitudes (Vance, Newburg, & Patankar, 
2014).  The current U.S. aviation regulatory structure makes any overflight of the 
populace at less than 1,000 ft. AGL illegal.  The applicable FAR 91.119 Minimum 
Safe Altitudes would be realistically impossible to enforce with widespread 
proliferation of sUAS.  A loiter, the time-based policy is possible to define privacy; 
but, while seemingly attractive, with advanced digital photography, infrared, noise, 
and scent collection/detection, it does not guarantee privacy.  To accommodate the 
sensitive policy issue of privacy, this specific aspect of sUAS operations deserves 
its regulatory part in the U.S. Code structure. 
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There are other policy issues that also share a strong technology relationship 
such as revisionary or backup modes for both air vehicle navigation and 
communication failures. Revisionary modes for either type of failure will have to 
be universally adaptable to all net participants. 
Employment.  The last, societal obstacle is the natural resistance to the 
changing job market.  The challenge will be to convince current, as well as, 
matriculating, professional aviation employees that when one job 
classification/function sets another must rise.  While traditional piloting and air 
traffic controlling will decrease, the need for aviation automation specialists, 
system safety monitor/management/cybersecurity specialists, and 
certification/validation specialists will rise, possibly outpacing the aviation 
positions which will be lost. 
Conclusion 
The rapid proliferation of UAS, particularly sUAS, will have significant 
operational implications for the ATC system of the future.  During the lengthy 
transition period, which has already started, when unmanned air vehicles will be 
mixed with conventionally piloted vehicles, integrating unmanned air vehicles 
safely presents significant technological and sociological challenges.  The sheer 
number of future manned and unmanned air vehicles suggests the current, voice-
based ATC system cannot scale to meet demand—another approach to managing 
air traffic must be considered.  The future of air traffic will likely be a fully 
networked environment where the absence of participation on the network could 
connote a potential intruder and a threat. 
If the satisfactory and complete integration of UAS is to occur, the 
overarching current U.S. air traffic management philosophy of                          first-
come/first served will need to migrate to on-time/first-served.  This transition will 
require a networked future where all participants have the ability to be recognized, 
contribute, share and pass information on the network, self-separate from other 
participants, de-conflict their trajectories with other air vehicles, and re-route and 
re-organize into alternate trajectories and flows when unforeseen obstacles are 
present. 
To achieve these objectives, a potential airspace design was introduced and 
explored along with the conceptual air traffic management philosophy of self-
separation.  In this future, all sUAS traffic would be contained in the lowest 
atmospheric layer, below 500ft AGL (Class G).  Manned, recreational, VFR, 
single-piston engine, non-networked aircraft would be restricted to the next lowest 
layer, that above 500ft AGL but below 2,500ft AGL (Class F).  Dedicated, 
commercial (for profit) airspace would start at 2,500ft AGL.  All manned and 
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unmanned air vehicles above 2,500ft AGL would need to be recognized nodes on 
the network.  All unmanned operations outside of Class G will be required to be 
active air traffic network participants and operate under IFR. 
The macro purpose of this paper is to entice and encourage professional 
dialog on future airspace options which would accommodate the blend of 
conventionally piloted, semi-autonomous and autonomous air vehicle network 
participants.  Acknowledging and discussing the significant, future airspace 
designs’ technological, cybersecurity, societal-trust, policy, liability, and 
employment implications are responsible steps to better understand the challenges 
ahead. 
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Acronyms and Associated Definitions 
ADS-B Out/In – Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast; ‘Out’ transmits 
information to the air traffic network; ‘In’ receives information 
from the air traffic network 
Air vehicle –  Physical flying vehicle, either manned or unmanned 
AGL – Above Ground Level 
ATC – Air Traffic Control 
FAR –  Federal Aviation Regulations 
FDC –  Flight Data Center 
FL – Flight Level; 1,000s of feet above mean sea level, predicated on 
a standard altimeter setting of 29.92 inches mercury 
ft. – Feet 
lbs. – Pounds weight 
ICAO – International Civil Aviation Organization 
IFR – Instrument Flight Rules - permits operations in MVMC and IMC 
IMC – Instrument Meteorological Conditions 
 (less than 500ft AGL ceilings and less than 3 NM flight visibility) 
MSL – Mean Sea Level 
MVMC – Marginal Visual Meteorological Conditions                                                      
(greater than IMC but less than VMC) 
NAS – National Airspace System 
NM –  Nautical mile (6,076 ft.) 
NOTAMS – Notices to Airmen 
Participant –  Air vehicle that is an active node on the future air traffic network 
SM – Statue Mile (5,280 ft.) 
sUAS –  Small Unmanned Aerial Systems, those weighing less than 55 
lbs. 
TCAS – Terminal Collision Avoidance System (currently, a pair-wise 
de-confliction) 
TOGW – Take-Off Gross Weight 
UAS –  Unmanned Aerial Systems, those weighing 55 lbs., or more 
VFR – Visual Flight Rules - requires VMC 
VMC – Visual Meteorological Conditions 
 (greater than 2,500ft AGL ceilings, and greater than 5 NM flight 
visibility) 
VTOL – Vertical Take-Off and Land 
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